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Abstract
We present a method for using neural networks to model evo-
lutionary population dynamics, and draw parallels to recent
deep learning advancements in which adversarially-trained
neural networks engage in coevolutionary interactions. We
conduct experiments which demonstrate that models from
evolutionary game theory are capable of describing the be-
havior of these neural population systems.
Introduction
Recent works in the field of deep learning have developed
algorithms which train neural networks through interaction,
rather than through optimization of a static loss function.
These algorithms display dynamics which are similar to
those observed in evolutionary simulations and those de-
scribed by evolutionary game theory. One such algorithm,
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) by (Goodfellow
et al., 2014), seeks to train a network to generate realistic
images based on a training set. It uses a pair of networks
trained against one another to simultaneously develop a net-
work capable of generating images and a discriminator net-
work capable of evaluating images for realism. Of particular
interest to this work is the design of the generator network,
which takes as input vectors sampled from a random distri-
bution, and transforms them into output images. Through
the lens of evolutionary simulation, the output distribution
induced by the generator can be viewed as a population of
candidate images which are evaluated for fitness by the dis-
criminator. The members of this population compete with
each other to occupy niches of realistic image types, and co-
operate to collectively match the distribution in the training
set.
We will investigate the following questions: Does embed-
ding evolutionary population dynamics in the substrate of a
neural network trained by stochastic gradient descent fun-
damentally alter the behavior of the system? Can existing
analysis tools from the fields of evolutionary computation
and artificial life predict the behavior of such systems, or ex-
plain divergence from the standard predictions? To this end,
we first present a neural model to simulate a coevolution-
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Figure 1: The layout of a standard GAN. G and D are the
generator and discriminator networks, T is the set of training
examples, Z is the latent input of G.
ary population over time. We then conduct experiments us-
ing this model in which we simulate well-understood matrix
games, and compare the resulting behavior to that obtained
from traditional simulation techniques. We thereby lay the
groundwork for future investigations into the application of
evolutionary game theory to more complex adversarially-
trained neural networks (such as GAN models), as well as
the use of such models as a testbed for artificial life simula-
tions.
Background
There have been many intersections between the fields of
evolutionary computation and neural networks. Neuro-
evolution algorithms such as GNARL (Angeline et al.,
1994), NEAT (Stanley and Miikkulainen, 2002) and Hyper-
NEAT (Stanley et al., 2009) employ evolutionary algorithms
to evolve the structure and weights of neural networks. (Mi-
ikkulainen et al., 2017) proposes a hybrid approach in which
network structure is evolved while weights are trained via
back-propagation.
Neural networks have also been used as controllers for
artificial agents in evolutionary simulations, as proposed in
(Harvey et al., 1992) and (Sims, 1994). Recurrent Neural
Networks are evolved to control physically embodied robots
in (Lipson and Pollack, 2000).
Deep reinforcement learning has applied neural models
to multi-agent systems. (Bloembergen et al., 2015) gives
an overview of the applicability of evolutionary models to
ar
X
iv
:1
80
4.
04
18
7v
1 
 [c
s.N
E]
  1
1 A
pr
 20
18
G
Z
X
Figure 2: Transformation of a simple uniform distribution,
Z, to a more complex bimodal distribution, X , by an exam-
ple generator, G.
reinforcement learning in general. In (Such et al., 2017),
genetic algorithms are proposed as method to evolve deep
neural networks in reinforcement learning settings.
Generative Adversarial Networks
We present here a brief overview of the design of GAN
systems as described in (Goodfellow et al., 2014). Fig-
ure 1 shows the basic layout of a GAN model. Two neural
networks, G (the generator) and D (the discriminator) are
trained adversarially, with the goal of training G to produce
novel realistic images. G takes as input a random vector
drawn from a random distribution, Z. It transforms that vec-
tor into an output image, which is then passed to D. D takes
as input images either drawn from a training set of real im-
ages, T , or the output of G, and attempts to classify them as
either real (0) or fake (1). D is trained by minimizing the
error of its classifications through gradient descent. G, on
the other hand, is trained by maximizing the error of D on
G’s outputs.
We are particularly concerned with the architecture of G,
as it will form the basis for our neural population model. G
transforms a simple distribution, Z into a complex distribu-
tion (an approximation of the manifold of realistic images
from which the samples in T are drawn). In order for G
to successfully fool D, it must not only produce realistic
samples, it must produce them with the proper frequencies.
Figure 2 shows a simplified example in which a generator
transforms samples from a uniform distribution to samples
from a bimodal distribution. In an actual GAN, the output
distribution is a high-dimensional distribution over the space
of possible images of some size.
Matrix Games and Evolutionary Game Theory
Matrix games have been used as a testbed for analyzing
evolutionary dynamics in computer models as presented in
(Maynard Smith and Price, 1973). This analysis is often
focused on the discovery of evolutionarily stable strategies
(ESS) (Maynard Smith, 1972), and the dynamics leading to-
wards them. (Fogel et al., 1998) and (Ficici and Pollack,
2000) examine the ability of evolutionary models to discover
and maintain an ESS using the Hawk-Dove game.
Neural Population Models
Our model is concerned with the class of matrix games de-
fined by a fixed set of strategies S and a payoff matrix M
of dimension |S| × |S| which defines the payoff received
by each strategy when played against each other strategy.
We will use the notation M(s1, s2) to indicate the payoff
received by strategy s1 against s2, where s1 and s2 may
be pure or mixed strategies. If they are mixed strategies,
M(s1, s2) is the weighted average of payoffs received.
The goal of our model is to represent the distribution of
the set of strategies in a population, which we represent as
P . Instead of explicitly representing that distribution, we
will construct a function Fθ (in the form of a neural network
with weights θ) which transforms a simple input distribution
Z to P . In this work, we let Z be a uniform distribution over
[0, 1]n for small n.
Given a sample z drawn from Z, we can compute Fθ(z)
to determine the strategy associated with z. For example, in
a game with three possible strategies,A,B, andC, we might
have Fθ(z) = [0.3, 0.5, 0.2], indicating a mixed strategy
composed of 30%A, 50%B and 20%C. To determine the
overall composition of the population, we repeatedly sam-
ple from Z and apply Fθ to retrieve a representative sample
of P .
Model Architecture
We represent Fθ(z) as a feed-forward neural network in
which the input is passed through a fully-connected layer
containing ten hidden units with sigmoid activations, fol-
lowed by a second fully-connected layer with |S| output
units and a softmax activation. The softmax operation in the
output layer has the effect of normalizing the output values
to sum to one, so as to represent a valid mixed strategy in the
game. The number of hidden units as well as the depth of the
network are effectively hyperparameters of the model. More
complex games with many strategies may require more com-
plex networks to successfully model.
Training
To model the evolutionary trajectory of the population,
we use stochastic gradient descent (SGD) to optimize the
weights θ to maximize the payoffs individual samples from
the population receive when matched against opponents also
drawn from the population. At each step of training, we
draw two sets of random samples from Z, called z1 and
z2, which will serve as mini-batches for the SGD algorithm.
z1 and z2 will have dimension b × n, where b is the mini-
batch size and n is the dimension of Z. We then compute
p1 = Fθ(z1) and p2 = Fθ(z2), which have dimension b× s
where s is the number of strategies in the game. We then
compute fitness values M(p1, p2) for each row of p1 by
competing it against the corresponding entry of p2 using the
game matrix.
We now have M(Fθ(z1), Fθ(z2)), which is a differen-
tiable function parameterized by θ. We can therefore com-
pute gradients for θ, and apply gradient ascent to maximize
the payoff received. Critically, we do not treat the computa-
tion of Fθ(z2) as a differentiable component of the system.
Instead, the values of Fθ(z2) are treated as constants. This
is done to prevent the system from improving the payoff of
Fθ(z1) by moving Fθ(z2) towards a worse strategy.
Algorithm 1 Training Procedure
Require: b, the batch size, n, the dimension of Z
for number of training iterations do
Draw samples z1 and z2 ∈ [0, 1]b×n from Z
Compute Fθ(z1) and Fθ(z2)
Compute M(Fθ(z1), Fθ(z2))
Compute ∇θ 1b
∑
M(Fθ(z1), Fθ(z2)), treating Fθ(z2)
as a constant
Update θ by ascending∇θ
end for
Initialization
In most neural network applications, the parameters of the
network are initialized to small random values. This means
that the initial outputs of the network are unpredictable.
However, in many evolutionary applications it is desirable
to be able to initialize the model at a variety of starting con-
figurations to observe the different trajectories that result.
For example, in the Hawk-Dove-Retaliator game, Maynard
Smith found two attractors, such that the fate of the popula-
tion depends on the initial proportions of the three strategies.
We propose an optional period of non-adversarial training
to initialize the network to output a desired starting configu-
ration. Given a target distribution D, which is an n-element
vector representing the desired frequencies of each of the n
strategies in a game, and whose elements sum to 1, we com-
pute the Jensen-Shannon (JS) divergence, between D and
the distribution resulting from Fθ(z):
JS(D,Fθ(z)) =
1
2
KLD(D||M) + 1
2
KLD(M ||Fθ(z))
whereM = 12 (D+Fθ(z)) is the average of the two distri-
butions, and KLD is the discrete KullbackLeibler divergence
calculated as:
KLD(P,Q) =
∑
s∈strategies
P (s)log
P (s)
Q(s)
The important property of the JS divergence for our pur-
poses is that it will be minimized whenD = Fθ(z). Further-
more, JSD(D,Fθ(z)) is a differentiable function param-
eterized by θ, so we can compute gradients and use SGD
Figure 3: Pure(v1) with  = 0.1 and maxv = 0.5. Note
that regardless of the value of maxv , Pure(v1) is within 
of 0 or 1.
to find values of θ which minimize it. We construct mini-
batches for SGD by samplying from z, and apply the train-
ing procedure until approximate convergence. The result is
a network which outputs a distribution very close to D.
Algorithm 2 Initialization Procedure
Require: b, the batch size, n, the dimension of Z and D,
the desired output distribution
while network has not converged do
Draw samples z ∈ [0, 1]b×n from Z
Compute Fθ(z)
Compute JSD(D,Fθ(z))
Compute ∇θJSD(D,Fθ(z))
Update θ by descending ∇θ
end while
Simulating Quasi-Pure Strategies
To this point, the model as described has been free to map an
individual sample z to an arbitrary mixed strategy. However,
it is sometimes desirable to examine models in which an in-
dividual must adopt a single pure strategy. This presents
a potential difficulty, as our training and initialization al-
gorithms require that network outputs be differentiable and
present meaningful gradients. Simply clamping the results
to 0 or 1 to enforce pure strategies would violate these con-
straints. The standard softmax operator is also insufficient,
as it does not restrict the outputs from falling anywhere
along the [0,1] range. A sigmoid or softmax operation with
a high exponent can force the outputs towards 0 or 1, but
will present near-zero gradients as they approximate a step
function.
To address this, we introduce a soft clamp operator, which
we term Pure(·). This operator takes as input a vector rep-
resenting a mixed strategy, and maps the largest strategy to a
value close to one, and the other strategies to values close to
zero. It does so in a way which preserves the property that
the strategy values sum to one, and which presents consis-
tent, meaningful gradients for training. The operator is pa-
rameterized by , a small value which determines how close
to 0 to 1 the outputs must be. Given a mixed strategy vector
v, with elements v0 through vn, this operator is defined as:
Pure(vi) =
{
(1− ) +  ∗ vi if argmaxv = i
 ∗ vi otherwise
This operator maps the largest strategy to the range [1 −
, 1], and all other strategies to the range [0, ], creating an
output which is very close to a pure strategy. Further, the
derivative of this function is a constant , allowing the train-
ing procedure to direct the network towards improvement.
Figure 3 shows the behavior of the Pure(·) operator.
Experiments
We present two experiments to demonstrate the ability of a
neural population model to capture the dynamics predicted
by standard methods such as the replicator equation. First,
we will analyze its behavior on the Hawk-Dove game (May-
nard Smith, 1988). This game has been used in the past as
a benchmark to analyze the ability of a proposed simulation
model to discover and maintain an evolutionary stable state
(ESS) (Ficici and Pollack, 2000). The Hawk-Dove game
has a single ESS, and the dynamics leading towards it are
straightforward. We should expect to see smooth conver-
gence. The second experiment will focus on the ability of
the neural model to capture non-convergent dynamics. We
will use the noisy iterated prisoner’s dilemma game, as de-
scribed in (Lindgren, 1992). We will restrict ourselves to the
dynamics of the four strategies of history length one: All-C,
Tit-for-Tat, Anti-Tit-for-Tat, and All-D. The replicator dy-
namics of this game result in a continuously changing pop-
ulation distribution, which does not fall into a stable ESS or
a simple cycle.
We will compare the behavior of these systems to the be-
havior shown under the time-discrete replicator equation:
xi(t) = xi(t− 1) + α[fi(x(t))− φ(x(t))]
Where xi(t) is the frequency of strategy i at time t, fi(·)
is the fitness of strategy i given a population, and φ(·) is
the average fitness of a population and α is a (small) step
size. We elect to use the time-discrete equation to match the
discrete nature of SGD training for the neural model.
Model Hyperparameters
Neural network models are often sensitive to the settings of
various hyperparameters. The details of these parameters
and their values are somewhat tangential to the motivation
of this work, so we will give only a brief overview of our
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Figure 4: Payoff matrices for the hawk-dove game (a) and
noisy iterated prisoners’ dilemma (b).
settings. The hyperparameters of our model are: the di-
mension of the latent space, Z, the optimizer, batch size,
and learning rate used for training, and the value of  in the
Pure(·) layer. For our experiments, we use the following
values. Z is of dimension 10, networks are trained using
the Adam optimizer (Kingma and Ba, 2014)1 with a learn-
ing rate of 0.0002 and a batch size of 2048, and  = 0.1. In
general, these parameters have been chosen through experi-
mentation.
Hawks and Doves
There are a variety of formulations of the Hawk Dove game
in the literature which vary the relative payoffs received by
the strategies. The fundamental dynamic is that when a
hawk faces a dove, the hawk receives the highest payoff
while the dove receives a small payoff (because the hawk
forces the dove away), when two hawks face each other,
both receive the lowest payoff (because they fight over the
reward, resulting in injury), and when two doves face each
other they receive a moderate payoff (because they split the
reward without fighting). We will use the payoffs defined in
(Ficici and Pollack, 2000)2, shown in Figure 4. This game
as a single ESS in which the population is 712 Hawks. Any
initial mix of Hawks and Doves will converge to this ESS.
We will test the neural model after initialization to a range
of starting population ratios. We will present results for
the 10-dimensional Z space, as well as results with a 2-
dimensional Z space to allow visualization of how the net-
work maps inputs to strategies. In order to calculate popu-
lation frequencies in the neural model, we will draw 10,000
samples from Z.
Figure 5 shows the trajectory for the game under the repli-
cator equation and the neural population model with both
quasi-pure strategies and mixed strategies. Note that the
1The Adam optimizer is chosen because it is the standard opti-
mizer used in GAN training (Chintala et al., 2016).
2Ficici et al. scale payoffs upward by 26 to make them all pos-
itive
Figure 5: Trajectories of the Hawk-Dove game under the replicator equation (left) and neural population model with quasi-pure
strategies (center) and mixed strategies (right). Each graph shows the portion of hawks in the population over time for five
different initial population mixes.
Figure 6: Mapping of a 2-dimensional Z to strategies for
the Hawk-Dove game. The top row shows a simulation with
quasi-pure strategies, while the bottom row shows a sim-
ulation with mixed strategies. Red represents hawks, and
green represents doves. Intermediate colors represent mixed
strategies.
time axes have been scaled to show similar slopes because
the choice of step size is somewhat arbitrary for both mod-
els. The dynamics of the neural model are noisier, due to
randomness in batch sampling and the indirect nature of the
relationship between fitness values and model updates. De-
spite this, the model is able to converge to the ESS, and re-
mains near it with only minor fluctuations. The choice of
pure or mixed strategies does not affect the overall dynam-
ics of the model.
Figure 6 presents church-window plots (Warde-Farley
and Goodfellow, 2016) which show the way the network
transforms input vectors into strategies. To enable easy vi-
sualization, we restrict the network to a 2-dimensional Z
space. Because the Hawk and Dove game presents simple
dynamics, this has little effect on the behavior of the model.
In these plots, the x and y coordinates correspond to the val-
ues of a sampled z vector, and the color indicates which
strategy the network transforms that vector to, with the red
channel representing Hawks, and the green channel repre-
senting Doves. We can see that the mixed strategy network
tends to produce a relatively homogeneous population, with
only minor spatial variation in strategy (at convergence, the
upper left, z = (0.0, 1.0), gives about 53% Hawks, while the
lower right, z = (1.0, 0.0) gives about 68% Hawk). On the
other hand, the quasi-pure network creates a strongly differ-
entiated population with a simple boundary.
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
We will use the payoffs for the noisy iterated prisoner’s
dilemma as defined by (Lindgren, 1992), as shown in Fig-
ure 4(c). The matrix reflects the average payoffs for a
game between four strategies, all-C, which always coop-
erates, TFT (tit-for-tat), which copies the opponent’s last
move, ATFT (anti-tit-for-tat), which plays the opposite of
the opponent’s last move, and all-D, which always defects.
We imagine the players playing an infinitely iterated game
using the standard prisoner’s dilemma payoffs, as in (Axel-
rod et al., 1987), with the addition of stochastic noise, which
will randomly alter a player’s move in a small fraction (0.01)
of rounds. The derivation of the payoff values is given in
(Lindgren, 1992).
Figure 7 shows the dynamics of this game as predicted by
the time-discrete replicator equation given an initial popu-
lation which is an equal mix of all strategies. We see that,
unlike the hawk-dove game, the system is non-convergent3,
with strategies rising and falling in frequency in a non-
cyclical manner.
As shown in Figure 8, we find that the neural model with
quasi-pure strategies is able to approximate these dynamics,
3Although the frequencies appear to level off near the end of
the simulation, this is actually a transient period of slow change,
not a final stable state.
Figure 7: Dynamics of the noisy iterated prisoner’s dilemma game under the time-discrete replicator equation (left) and the
neural model with mixed strategies (right).
Figure 8: Dynamics of the noisy iterated prisoner’s dilemma game under the neural population model with quasi-pure strategies.
Four runs are shown, selected to highlight varying degrees of success.
Figure 9: Mapping of a 2-dimensional Z to strategies for
the noisy iterated prisoner’s dilemma . The top row shows a
simulation with quasi-pure strategies, while the bottom row
shows a simulation with mixed strategies.
in that the strategies rise and fall in the same order, but the
magnitudes and durations of the peaks are often amplified.
As we see in the replicator dynamics, a population consist-
ing almost entirely of TFT and ATFT is semi-stable, and the
magnified fluctuations in the neural model sometimes allow
it to enter such a state earlier in the simulation, leading to
long periods of minimal change.
Unlike in the Hawk-Dove game, we observe a wide va-
riety of outcomes in the noisy iterated prisoner’s dilemma,
even from identical initial strategy frequencies4. In some
sense, this behavior is expected - the game does not have a
simple attractor, and so deviations from the predicted repli-
cator dynamics can be compounded, and steer the system
towards a different outcome.
On the other hand, the mixed strategy model is unable to
capture these dynamics, as seen on the right side of Figure 8.
The population converges steadily towards all-D, with only
a slight rise in ATFT in the early phases.
Figure 9 shows the mapping of a 2-dimensional Z space
to strategies for both the quasi-pure and mixed models. As
in the Hawk-Dove game, the mixed model produces a rel-
atively uniform population which smoothly converges to-
wards its final outcome. By contrast, the quasi-pure model
divides the Z space into discrete regions for each strategy,
which grow and shrink and as the population distribution
changes.
Discussion
Our motivation is not to present these neural models as a
practical way to investigate games as simple as Hawks and
Doves, but rather to demonstrate the applicability of lessons
4Note that identical initial frequencies does not mean an iden-
tical initialization. A homogeneous population of mixed strategies
may have the same total frequencies as a heterogeneous population
of pure strategies, and even two homogeneous populations may
have different network weights.
from evolutionary game theory and coevolution to under-
standing the dynamics of neural network systems in which
loss is calculated through interaction. Ultimately, the goal of
systems like GANs is to discover a Nash equilibrium using
optimization tools designed for finding static minima. Our
neural population models allow us to examine the suitability
of these tools to this new application in a setting where we
have a firm theoretical understanding of the target dynamics.
For example, even in the more successful runs, the neu-
ral model struggles to maintain the dynamics of the noisy
iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. As time progresses, the
model swings more and more wildly towards extremes, until
it enters long periods of stability in which the activations of
the neural network are saturated (which in turn causes van-
ishingly small gradients, contributing to the stability). As
we see in some of the less successful runs, this dynamic
threatens to derail the simulation by prematurely removing
diversity from the population (in particular by reducing the
population to contain only TFT and ATFT). These problems
seem to mirror problems observed in GAN training, called
“mode collapse” - the generator often prematurely collapses
to produce only a few types of outputs, failing to capture the
diversity of the target distribution.
The very fact that there are successful and unsuccessful
runs is itself a cause for concern, the only difference be-
tween these runs is the random initialization of the network
and the randomly sampled z values used during training.
GAN training is similarly sensitive to initial conditions (Lu-
cic et al., 2017) (as is back-propagation in general (Kolen
and Pollack, 1991)), but the problem space of image gen-
eration is far too high dimensional to allow careful analysis
of the effect of parameter initialization. We propose that the
low-dimensionality of neural population models makes them
more amenable to detailed understanding of the effects of
different initialization procedures and hyperparameter set-
tings.
The failure of the mixed strategy model to capture com-
plex dynamics is somewhat surprising - why is the Pure(·)
operator so critical to the system? Our analysis indicates
that this occurs because the network in the mixed strategy
model has a tendency to couple the frequencies of different
values by using the same internal weights to control mul-
tiple outputs. In particular, in the replicator dynamics and
the quasi-pure neural dynamics, we see a strong differentia-
tion between the initial trajectories of All-C and TFT. All-C
drops precipitously, while TFT has only a brief initial de-
cline. By contrast, in the mixed neural dynamics, we see All-
C and TFT decline at the same rate, never diverging from
each other by more than a fraction of a percentage point.
The initial separation of All-C and TFT is critical to the
long-term dynamics of the system. TFT is able to outper-
form All-D only when the All-C strategies which All-D
preys upon have been eliminated, but sufficient TFT strate-
gies remain (because TFT performs well against itself com-
pared to the performance of All-D against TFT). If by the
time All-C is nearly eliminated, TFT is also nearly elimi-
nated, the TFT players cannot gain enough fitness to outpace
the All-D players, and All-D remains the dominant strategy.
To verify that this is indeed what’s happening, we exam-
ined the gradients of our loss function with respect to the
four strategy outputs. As expected, we observed that the ini-
tial gradients for All-C and TFT are different - they suggest
that All-C should fall much faster than TFT. However, when
these gradients are propagated back to the internal weights
of the network, the actual impact of the updates is to make
both fall at a similar rate.
We conjecture that maintaining a diverse population, as
is forced by the Pure(·) operator, is critical to prevent-
ing the degenerate behavior observed in the mixed neural
model. The importance of maintaining population diversity
in evolutionary algorithms is well-studied (Ursem, 2002),
and Goodfellow et al. report the occasional occurrence of
catastrophic loss of diversity in GAN training.
Conclusion & Future Work
We have presented a model which combines elements from
the fields of deep learning and artificial life to demonstrate
the potential for intellectual cross-pollination between these
disciplines. Our model demonstrates the ability of neural
networks to simulate population dynamics, and the applica-
bility of evolutionary game theory results to the behavior of
these networks.
Our future work will focus on extending this model with
the goal of providing a unifying bridge between the two
fields, in the manner of (Farmer, 1990). We will seek to ana-
lyze obstacles facing GAN training through the lens of evo-
lutionary game theory, and seek to demonstrate the power of
an individual neural network to compactly model an entire
population of complex agents, as a step towards open-ended
evolution.
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